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ABSTRACT: This paper is an investigation into the metaphysics of social objects such as political borders, 
states, and organizations. I articulate a metaphysical puzzle concerning such objects and then propose a 
novel account of social objects that provides a solution to the puzzle. The basic idea behind the puzzle is 
that under appropriate circumstances, seemingly concrete social objects can apparently be created by acts 
of agreement, decree, declaration, or the like. Yet there is reason to believe that no concrete object can be 
created in this way. The central idea of my positive account is that social objects have a normative 
component to them, and seemingly concrete social objects have both normative and material components. 
I develop this idea more rigorously using resources from the Aristotelian hylomorphic tradition. The 
resulting normative hylomorphic account, I argue, solves the puzzle by providing a satisfying explanation 
of creation-by-agreement and the like, while at the same time avoiding the difficulties facing extant 





 This paper is an investigation into the metaphysics of social objects such as political 
borders, states, and organizations. Roughly speaking, social objects are things that can be created 
through the performance of social acts such as agreement, decree, declaration, or the like. 
Despite the intuitive interest and practical significance of social objects, there has been relatively 
little work done on the metaphysics of these objects within contemporary analytic philosophy. 
Metaphysicians studying objects have written extensively on the metaphysics of ordinary 
material things such as trees, tables, and statues. Yet it is unclear whether social objects are of a 
kind with such ordinary material things. Philosophers working in the field of social ontology, on 
the other hand, have traditionally focused primarily on social and institutional facts such as the 
fact that two people are going for a walk together or the fact that certain pieces of paper count as 
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money in the United States.1 Yet social objects are not facts but things. Finally, there has been a 
lot of recent work on the metaphysics of social groups such as clubs, committees, teams, and 
courts.2 Yet many social objects are not social groups, and it is unclear whether and to what 
extent the theses about social groups apply to social objects more generally. Thus, social objects 
as a general class have been undertheorized. This paper is part of a larger project that aspires to 
bring the metaphysics of social objects more to the fore in contemporary analytic metaphysics.  
The paper has two main aims. The first is to articulate a metaphysical puzzle concerning 
a certain subclass of social objects—namely, social objects of a seemingly concrete character. 
Examples of such social objects include physical borders such as the Roman Empire’s river 
borders to the north and east, states with a physical territory such as the United States of 
America, and organizations and institutions that have a physical location such as King’s College 
London. The basic idea behind the puzzle is that under appropriate circumstances, seemingly 
concrete social objects can apparently be created by acts of agreement, decree, declaration, or the 
like. Yet there is reason to believe that no concrete object can be created in this way.3 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, e.g., Gilbert (1989), Searle (1990), Tuomela (1995), and Bratman (2014) on social facts 
and collective intentionality. See, e.g., Searle (1995, 2010) and Thomasson (2003, 2009) on 
institutional facts. The topic of social and institutional objects has been broached by some social 
ontologists including Quinton (1975–76), Ruben (1983, 1985: chs. 1–2), Smith (1994, 2003), 
Smith and Varzi (2000), Thomasson (2003, 2009), Baker (2007: ch. 3), Elder-Vass (2010: chs. 
6–7), Smit, Buekens, and Du Plessis (2011, 2014), Hindriks (2012, 2013), Epstein (2014, 2015), 
Hansson Wahlberg (2014, 2019a, 2019b), Smit and Buekens (2017), and Passinsky (2020).   
2 See, e.g., Uzquiano (2004, 2018), Effingham (2010), Ritchie (2013, 2015, 2020), Epstein 
(2015: chs. 10–18, 2019), Hawley (2017), Hansson Wahlberg (2019a), Thomasson (2019), and 
Fine (2020).  
3 Other authors have noted that the creation of social reality through human agreement, decision, 
declaration, or subjective attitudes is puzzling. See, e.g., Searle (1995: 1, 2010: ix), Thomasson 
(2003: 269), Hansson Wahlberg (2014: 546, 2019b: §1–3), Smit and Buekens (2017: §1–2), and 
Korman (2020: §3). Cf. Zimmerman (2002: 333–35) and Effingham (2010: 253) on speaking 
things into existence. Cf. also Passinsky (2020: §3).	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puzzle is both interesting in its own right and a testament to the fact that social objects warrant 
more attention from metaphysicians than they have so far received.  
The second main aim is to advance a novel account of social objects that provides a 
satisfying solution to the puzzle and avoids the difficulties facing extant accounts. The central 
idea is that social objects have a normative component to them, and seemingly concrete social 
objects have both normative and material components. I develop this idea more rigorously using 
resources from the Aristotelian hylomorphic tradition. Material components, I suggest, are the 
‘matter’ of seemingly concrete social objects and normative components are their ‘form’. This 
normative hylomorphic account, I argue, solves the puzzle by providing a satisfying explanation 
of creation-by-agreement and the like: in circumstances where suitable material components 
already exist, new concrete social objects can be created through the creation of new rights, 
duties, obligations, permissions, etc.; and this may be done through the exercise of normative 
powers, which may take the form of an agreement.  
Here is a roadmap of the paper. In section 2, I formulate the puzzle in more precise terms. 
In section 3, I examine existing solutions and review the main difficulties with them. I then 
articulate a number of desiderata that an alternative solution should satisfy. In section 4, I 
propose a normative account of social objects and indicate how such an account can solve the 
puzzle. I develop the details of this account in section 5, drawing on ideas in the hylomorphism 
literature. I then explain how the resulting normative hylomorphic theory satisfies our desiderata 
while at the same time providing a satisfying solution to the puzzle. In section 6, I further 
develop the account in response to two challenges. I conclude, in section 7, by comparing my 
account with two prominent views in the social ontology literature, namely John Searle’s theory 
of institutional facts and Katherine Ritchie’s account of organized social groups.  
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2. The puzzle 
 
 Let us imagine that there are two people living on a desert island, Crusoe and Cassandra. 
One day, they decide to divvy up the island territory between themselves. They agree that River, 
which runs through the island, is to be the border between their respective territories. In doing so, 
they thereby bring into existence Border.  
The creation of Border may seem unremarkable. But in fact, it is metaphysically 
puzzling. The puzzle may be formulated as follows:  
(1) Border is a concrete object in the external world. 
(2) Border is brought into existence by agreement.  
(3) Agreement cannot bring into existence concrete objects in the external world.  
A few remarks are in order. As I am using the term ‘concrete’, an object is concrete just in case it 
exists in space and time. A concrete object in the external world is a concrete object that is 
located outside of our own minds. It is also important to clarify what it means for something to 
be brought into existence by agreement. As I understand this locution, an object x is brought into 
existence by an act ϕ just in case either (i) ϕ constitutes the creation of x (in the way that an 
utterance may constitute the making of a promise), or (ii) ϕ is a proximate cause of x’s coming 
into existence (in the way that bombarding plutonium with alpha particles may be a proximate 
cause of some curium’s coming into existence).  
Each of the three premises is independently plausible, but they are jointly inconsistent. 
Premises (1) and (2) entail that in the envisioned scenario a concrete object in the external world 
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is brought into existence by agreement, but this is inconsistent with premise (3). Let us now 
consider the motivation for each of the premises in turn.  
Premise (1) is motivated by the observation that Border appears to possess non-trivial 
spatial and temporal properties. Thus, for instance, Border is located on a particular desert island, 
where it lies between Crusoe’s and Cassandra’s territories. It is also the sort of thing that can be 
physically crossed or traversed. Furthermore, Border did not exist prior to Crusoe’s and 
Cassandra’s arrival on the island, but at a subsequent point in time it came into existence. Thus, 
it appears that Border exists in space and time, in much the same way that trees, tables, and 
chairs exist in space and time. It follows that Border is concrete in the relevant sense. Moreover, 
given that Border is spatially located between Crusoe’s and Cassandra’s territories, it follows 
that Border is located outside of Crusoe’s and Cassandra’s minds.  
 The support for premise (2) is our intuitive judgment that Crusoe and Cassandra create 
Border by agreement. Of course, certain background conditions have to obtain in order for their 
agreement to be successful. Notably, River has to exist. But it would be a mistake to say that 
Border is created in part by the natural processes that created River. For these natural processes 
occurred too far in the past to be a proximate cause of Border’s coming into existence. And it 
would be counterintuitive to suppose that these processes are partly constitutive of Border’s 
creation, as this would entail that Border was being created before Crusoe and Cassandra even 
arrived on the island. So I contend that the correct description of the case is that within a certain 
setting, Crusoe and Cassandra create Border by (mere) agreement.   
Lastly, premise (3) is supported by a metaphysical principle that says that thought and 
talk alone cannot bring into existence concrete objects in the external world.4 The intuitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Cf. Korman (2020: §3).  
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appeal of this principle is conveyed well by Dean Zimmerman and Nikk Effingham. Zimmerman 
says that many of us share a “powerful resistance to the idea that changes in our ways of talking 
about things, even coupled with simple changes in some of our nonverbal reactions to things, 
could by themselves bring any concrete physical object into existence” (2002: 335). And 
Effingham writes, “I think it is strange that merely speaking and intoning certain phrases could 
cause anything to exist ... The thought is that only wizards and warlocks can bring things into 
existence by merely uttering a few phrases” (2010: 253). Since an act of agreement consists of 
nothing more than thought and talk, it follows from this principle that agreement by itself cannot 
bring into existence concrete objects in the external world.  
Let me now consider two initial attempts at defusing the puzzle. The first rejects the 
metaphysical principle that motivates premise (3) on the grounds that ready-mades are clear 
counterexamples to the principle. To illustrate, suppose that you find a piece of driftwood that is 
conveniently shaped to serve as a coffee table, and you bring it home and start using it as a 
coffee table.5 Have you not brought into existence a new concrete object—viz., a coffee table—
by merely thinking of the driftwood as a coffee table? To my mind, this is not a clear 
counterexample to the principle, as it is unclear whether a new object is brought into existence in 
this case.6 At least ordinarily, we would not describe this as a case of making, creating, or 
producing a coffee table. In contrast, we regularly use the vocabulary of creation to describe 
cases like that of Border—we talk of borders being established, created, and drawn; and we talk 
of states and universities being founded, created, formed, and established. More importantly, the 
presence of putative counterexamples to the principle does not undercut the principle’s intuitive 
appeal, as shown by the case of Border. The intuitive appeal of the principle can only be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This example is discussed by Zimmerman (2002: 335) and Baker (2007: 43–44).  
6 Cf. Korman (2020: §3.3).  
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undercut by providing a satisfying explanation of how thought and talk alone can bring into 
existence concrete objects in the external world. Thus, insofar as ready-mades are putative 
counterexamples to the principle, they do not defuse the puzzle but rather extend it to new cases.  
The second attempt at defusing the puzzle says that it equivocates on ‘concrete’. Let us 
say that an object is strongly concrete just in case it occupies a relatively determinate region of 
space at every time at which it exists,7 and weakly concrete just in case it is located in spacetime. 
The contention, then, is that premise (1) is true if ‘concrete’ means weakly concrete but false if it 
means strongly concrete, as borders do not occupy regions of space in the way that ordinary 
material objects do. On the other hand, premise (3) is true if ‘concrete’ means strongly concrete 
but false if it means weakly concrete, as the metaphysical principle supporting premise (3) is 
intuitively compelling only if ‘concrete’ means strongly concrete. Thus, on either way of 
disambiguating the puzzle, one of the premises is false. In response, let me first say that the 
metaphysical principle behind premise (3) seems intuitively compelling to me even if ‘concrete’ 
means weakly concrete. But more importantly, Border does in fact occupy a region of space. 
While it is true that most modern-day real-world borders do not occupy regions of space, the 
reason for this is that this is what the relevant parties agreed to, what the authorities decreed, or 
what the law stipulates. We may suppose, however, that in our imaginary scenario, Crusoe and 
Cassandra simply agree that the river is to be the border. Given that this is the content of their 
agreement, Border is plausibly taken to occupy the same region of space as River. Thus, premise 
(1) is true even if ‘concrete’ means strongly concrete.  
One final note regarding the setup of the puzzle. While I have formulated the puzzle 
using a simple imaginary case, I believe that there are many real-world cases that are puzzling in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Cf. Rosen (2017: §3.1) on this way of characterizing the abstract/concrete distinction.  
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a similar way. For example, the river border between Germany and Poland, which runs through 
the town of Gorlitz, was the product of an agreement; the United States of America was founded 
with the Declaration of Independence; and King’s College London was established by royal 
charter. Of course, in complex real-world cases like these, the creative process usually involves 
more than just an agreement, decree, declaration, or the like. Nevertheless, such acts play a 
central and prominent creative role. This is reflected in the way in which we ordinarily think and 
talk about these cases—for instance, we say that the United States was founded on July 4, 1776 
with the Declaration of Independence. The same intuitions that support the idea that thought and 
talk alone cannot bring into existence new concrete objects in the external world also support the 
idea that thought and talk cannot play this sort of central and prominent role in the creative 
process. So, I suggest, many real-world cases of the creation of social objects are puzzling in 
roughly the way that the creation of Border is puzzling.  
 
3. Existing solutions  
 
Various existing views on the ontology of social objects have the resources to solve the 
puzzle, in one way or another. In this section I review these existing solutions and the main 
difficulties with them. I do not claim that these difficulties are decisive. However, I do believe 
that they provide us with sufficient motivation to explore alternative solutions to the puzzle. I 
conclude the section by formulating a number of desiderata that an adequate alternative solution 
should satisfy.  
3.1 Identity view  
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The first solution may be drawn from the following passage in John Searle’s The 
Construction of Social Reality: 
 
Such material objects as are involved in institutional reality, e.g. bits of paper, are objects 
like any others, but the imposition of status-functions on these objects creates a level of 
description of the object where it is an institutional object, e.g., a twenty dollar bill. The 
object is no different; rather, a new status with an accompanying function has been 
assigned to an old object (1995: 57).8 
 
In this passage, I take Searle to be endorsing an identity view on which ‘twenty dollar bill’ and 
‘bit of paper’ are just two different ways of describing one and the same object. On this view, a 
twenty dollar bill is numerically identical to a bit of paper. And since Searle is using the twenty 
dollar bill as an example to illustrate a more general view, I take him to be endorsing the identity 
view for social objects more generally—viz., that every token social object of a seemingly 
concrete character is identical to a token ordinary material object. This view can solve the puzzle 
by denying premise (2) on the basis of the following reasoning: River is evidently not brought 
into existence by agreement. But Border just is River. So it follows that Border is not brought 
into existence by agreement.  
 There is a well-known problem for such an identity view when it comes to ordinary 
material things and their constituting matter.9 The canonical example is a statue which is molded 
from a lump of clay. The identity theorist says that the statue is identical to the lump of clay. Yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Searle also writes elsewhere: “there is only one object that is both a piece of paper and a dollar 
bill, but the fact that it is a piece of paper is not the same fact as that it is a dollar bill, even 
though they are both facts about one and the same object” (2003: 302).  
9 See, e.g., Wiggins (1968), Johnston (1992), Baker (1997), Thomson (1998), and Fine (2003).  
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the lump of clay apparently existed before the statue came into existence. Moreover, it seems 
that the lump of clay could continue to exist if rolled into the shape of a ball, whereas the statue 
could not survive such a transformation. So the statue does not share all properties with the lump 
of clay. By Leibniz’s Law, which says that a and b are identical only if they share all properties, 
it follows that the statue is not identical to the lump of clay. The identity view of seemingly 
concrete social objects faces exactly the same problem. Consider: River apparently existed 
before Border came into existence; and it seems that River could continue to exist if all of 
humankind perished, whereas Border could not continue to exist in such circumstances. So 
Border does not share all properties with River, and is therefore not identical to River.10 The 
identity view of seemingly concrete social objects is no more palatable than the identity view of 
ordinary material objects. So those of us who reject the identity view of ordinary material objects 
for Leibniz’s Law reasons should also reject the identity view of seemingly concrete social 
objects, for similar reasons. 
 A more sophisticated sort of identity view has been put forward and discussed by Tobias 
Hansson Wahlberg (2014: §5).11 This view embraces a four-dimensionalist theory of persistence 
according to which ordinary material objects persist through time by having different temporal 
parts at different times, and it identifies token social objects such as dollar bills and borders with 
temporal parts of token ordinary material objects (or mereological sums of such temporal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Cf. Uzquiano (2004) on the Supreme Court, Hindriks (2013: 419) on organizations, Ritchie 
(2013: §2–4) on social groups, Hansson Wahlberg (2014: 545–46) on governments, and Korman 
(2020: §2.1) on stores.  
11 Hansson Wahlberg does not endorse this view, but offers it up as a more promising alternative 
for those who wish to identify token institutional objects with token material objects.  
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parts).12 On this view, Border may be identified with a proper temporal part of River—namely, 
the temporal part of River that begins to exist at the time of Crusoe and Cassandra’s agreement 
and continues to exist until their agreement is nullified. Like the identity view considered above, 
this view can solve the puzzle by denying premise (2). The reasoning is as follows: Temporal 
parts of ordinary material objects exist regardless of anything we do, and so the temporal parts of 
River exist regardless of anything we do. But Border just is a temporal part of River. So it 
follows that Border exists regardless of anything we do, and is therefore not brought into 
existence by human agreement.  
This sophisticated identity view avoids the problem from Leibniz’s Law in the case of 
temporal properties. For the temporal part of River with which Border is identified comes into 
and goes out of existence when Border does. Furthermore, it may be argued that the view can 
appeal to Lewisian counterpart theory to deal with the problem from Leibniz’s Law in the case of 
modal properties (cf. Hansson Wahlberg 2014: 553 n. 51). But even so, the view would still run 
into trouble when it comes to other sorts of properties.13 For example, Border may be just or 
unjust, legitimate or illegitimate, fair or unfair. But neither River nor its temporal parts possess 
any such properties. They are not the sorts of things that can be just or unjust, legitimate or 
illegitimate, fair or unfair.14 Thus, even the sophisticated identity view is unable to entirely avoid 
the problem from Leibniz’s Law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Social objects such as states, governments, and universities require a more nuanced treatment. 
These objects may be identified with mereological sums of temporal parts of mereological sums 
of token ordinary material objects.	  
13 Cf. Fine (2003: §3) on the apparent divergence of various non-temporal and non-modal 
properties in the case of the statue and the lump of clay.  
14 Note that this problem also plagues a four-dimensionalist view that identifies Border with an 
instantaneous temporal part (i.e. a ‘stage’) of River, since an instantaneous temporal part of 
River is not the sort of thing that can be just or unjust, legitimate or illegitimate, fair or unfair. 
See Hansson Wahlberg (2014: §5) for a discussion of the stage view of institutional objects and 
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3.2 Immaterialism  
 Other authors in the social ontology literature maintain that at least some social objects 
are abstract. For instance, Barry Smith suggests that some borders and air-traffic corridors are 
abstract (2003: 290–91), and Amie Thomasson contends that laws, governments, and 
corporations are abstract (2003: 282–83).15 Smith and Thomasson themselves do not take 
seemingly concrete social objects like river borders to be abstract. Nevertheless, their view might 
be extended to this class of social objects. The resulting immaterialist view could then solve our 
puzzle by denying premise (1) on the grounds that Border is abstract rather than concrete. The 
obvious difficulty with this view is that it entails that Border does not exist in both space and 
time. Yet Border appears to possess non-trivial spatial and temporal properties, which suggests 
that it does exist in both space and time.  
 Daniel Korman has recently proposed a version of immaterialism that speaks to this 
difficulty (2020: §4.1, §5.1). On his view, seemingly concrete social objects such as restaurants, 
stores, universities, and states are fundamentally of a kind with abstract artifacts such as poems 
and novels. Both kinds of objects are immaterial, but they have material manifestations. Thus, 
for example, the novel Anna Karenina is an immaterial object whose material manifestations are 
its physical copies. Similarly, the United States of America is an immaterial object whose 
material manifestations are its particular tokens, instances, or what have you. A proponent of this 
immaterialist view may contend that Border is an immaterial object which inherits certain spatial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
its advantages over the more standard four-dimensionalist view discussed above. See also Faller 
(2019) for a defense of the stage view of social groups.  
15 In his later work, Searle also countenances certain abstract social objects including 
corporations and electronic money. See Searle (2010: ch. 5).  
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and temporal properties from its material manifestation, River.16 Border is thus both immaterial 
and concrete in the relevant sense, i.e. it exists in both space and time (cf. Korman 2020: 445). 
This view could solve the puzzle by denying premise (3) on the grounds that agreement can 
bring into existence certain concrete objects in the external world, namely immaterial objects that 
have material manifestations.  
 Even supposing that we can make sense of the idea that immaterial things can exist in 
both space and time,17 the proposed assimilation of seemingly concrete social objects to abstract 
artifacts such as poems and novels is problematic. Poems and novels can have multiple material 
manifestations at a single time. For example, there can be multiple physical copies of Anna 
Karenina at a given time. This motivates the view that Anna Karenina is an immaterial type (or 
kind) that has concrete tokens (or instances). In contrast, seemingly concrete social objects do 
not seem capable of having multiple material manifestations at a single time. Thus, for example, 
at present there is only one material manifestation of the United States of America, and it is 
difficult to imagine a possible scenario in which another material manifestation comes into 
being. Even if the United States were to acquire territory on the other side of the world or on 
another planet, this territory would just become part and parcel of the one and only material 
manifestation of the United States. It would not constitute a distinct ‘copy’ of the United States. 
Thus, unlike poems and novels, seemingly concrete social objects are not plausibly taken to be 
immaterial types (or kinds) that have concrete tokens (or instances).  
3.3 Eliminativism  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Cf. Liebesman and Magidor (2017: §3) on property inheritance in the case of informational 
and physical books.   
17 Some would argue that being spatially located is definitive of materiality, and so we cannot 
make sense of this idea. See, e.g., Markosian (2000).  
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       A different solution to the puzzle is suggested by another one of Searle’s remarks. “What 
we think of as social objects, such as governments, money, and universities, are in fact just 
placeholders for patterns of activities,” he writes (1995: 57). The suggestion here seems to be 
that terms such as ‘government’, ‘money’, and ‘university’, which appear to refer to social 
objects, are in fact serving as ‘placeholders’ for patterns of human activities because there are no 
social objects for these terms to refer to. Such an eliminativist view, which refuses to 
countenance social objects, solves the puzzle by denying premises (1) and (2) on the grounds that 
Border does not exist, and so a fortiori it is not a concrete object in the external world and it is 
not brought into existence by agreement. 
       There is a familiar problem with eliminativism when it comes to ordinary material things: 
the view conflicts with what we ordinarily believe.18 For our ordinary belief is that there are such 
things as tables, chairs, and statues. The eliminativist view of social objects faces exactly the 
same problem. For our ordinary belief is that there are such things as borders, states, and 
universities. Those of us who reject the eliminativist view of ordinary material things because of 
the conflict with ordinary belief should likewise reject the eliminativist view of social objects.   
 Hansson Wahlberg has recently proposed an interesting variant on the eliminativist view 
of social objects. Concerning the case of a corporation seemingly created by declaration, he 
writes: 
 
I think the idea that an object is literally created [by declaration] needs to be avoided … a 
declaration to the effect that a corporation exists is made, and because of this declaration 
it becomes true to say, in a tensed language and within a suitable reference frame, “A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Korman (2009, 2015: ch. 4).  
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corporation, founded in such and such a way, exists”. The truth-maker for such an 
existential assertion, however, should not be taken to be a new, ontic, institutional object 
that is somehow brought into existence in the world … Rather, the truth-maker (or truth-
makers) should be assumed to consist simply of the declaration itself, together with 
representations of the relevant legal regulation (2019b: 19, emphasis in original).     
 
As I understand the proposal, corporations do not really exist.19 Nevertheless, according to the 
proposal, in the context of ordinary discourse it is true to say things like “Google exists” and 
“Google was brought into existence by declaration” because the truthmakers for such ordinary 
statements are just the relevant declarations together with representations of the relevant legal 
regulation. Yet if these statements are true, then it would seem to follow by Tarski’s T-schema 
that Google exists and that Google was brought into existence by declaration. Thus, I take it that 
on the most plausible construal of this proposal, corporations do exist in some sense. Let us say 
that they existord (exist in the ordinary ‘lightweight’ sense), but they do not existont (exist in the 
ontological ‘heavyweight’ sense).20 
 This truthmaker view of social objects does not conflict with ordinary belief because it 
countenances the existenceord of things like borders, states, and universities. At the same time, it 
provides a novel solution to the puzzle, viz. that it equivocates on ‘existence’: Premise (2) is true 
if ‘existence’ means existenceord but false if it means existenceont, as Border is brought into 
existenceord by agreement but it is not brought into existenceont by agreement. On the other hand, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Cf. Hansson Wahlberg’s remarks to the effect that such objects do not exist “in a worldly 
sense” (2019b: 22) or as “ontic” or “worldly” entities (2019b: 19, 23). 
20 On one prominent way of developing this idea, the ordinary English quantifier is semantically 
associated with a different domain than the metaphysically privileged quantifier which ‘carves 
nature at its joints’. See Dorr (2005: §7). Cf. also Chalmers (2009: 95–96), Sider (2009: 411–16), 
and Cameron (2010: 255–56) on the idea that there are different quantifiers.     
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premise (3) is true if ‘existence’ means existenceont but false if it means existenceord, as 
agreement cannot bring into existenceont concrete objects in the external world but it can bring 
such objects into existenceord. Thus, on either way of disambiguating the puzzle, one of the 
premises is false.  
I am in considerable agreement with this solution. Granted that there is a viable 
distinction between existence in the ordinary sense and existence in the ontological sense, I agree 
that on the ontological reading of the puzzle premise (2) is plausibly rejected. For the intuitive 
judgment that supports premise (2) concerns the ordinary sense of existence as opposed to some 
heavyweight ontological sense. Thus, I think that the puzzle should be given its ordinary reading. 
Furthermore, I agree that on the ordinary reading premise (3) should ultimately be rejected. 
However, I take it that a solution which rejects premise (3) is fully satisfying only insofar as it 
provides a satisfying explanation of how agreement can bring into existence new concrete 
objects in the external world. In particular, it should provide an account of what concrete social 
objects are, which elucidates why these things can be brought into existence by agreement and 
the like. The truthmaker view does not provide such an account, as its focus is on ordinary 
statements about social objects rather than the objects themselves.21 Thus, the view on its own 
does not provide a fully satisfying solution to the puzzle.  
3.4 The desiderata  
 In light of the preceding discussion, let us now articulate a number of desiderata for an 
alternative solution to the puzzle. To avoid the difficulties faced by the identity views, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The truthmaker theorist might resist the demand to provide such an account on the grounds 
that concrete social objects do not existont on her view. Yet it is very plausible to suppose that if 
an object exists in any sense whatsoever, then there is something that it is to be that object. Given 
that concrete social objects existord on the truthmaker view, it follows that we can legitimately 
ask what these objects are.  
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immaterialist views, and the eliminativist view, an alternative solution should satisfy the 
following three desiderata:  
(i) Existence: The existence of Border is countenanced.  
(ii) Non-identity: Border is not taken to be identical to River (or a temporal part of River).  
(iii) Materiality: A material aspect to Border is countenanced.  
In addition, insofar as the solution rejects premise (3), it should provide a satisfying explanation 
of how Border is brought into existence by agreement. I turn now to the task of developing a 
solution that satisfies these desiderata.  
 
4. A normative account   
 
My basic proposal is that social objects have a normative component to them. Thus, their 
existence is partly a normative matter—namely, a matter of the existence of rights, duties, 
obligations, permissions, requirements, prohibitions, or the like.22 The seemingly concrete social 
objects that are of special interest to us have both normative and material components to them. 
So their existence is partly a normative matter and partly a matter of the existence of concrete 
material things. Consider Border. We may take its material component to be River and its 
normative components to involve the new obligations or permissions that are in effect as a result 
of Crusoe and Cassandra’s agreement (e.g., the obligation to not cross River without the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Many philosophers working on social ontology have suggested that various social entities be 
understood in normative terms, and I take my proposal to be broadly in line with this approach to 
social reality. See, e.g., Searle (1995) on status functions entailing deontic powers, Witt (2011) 
on gender as a mega social role that is associated with a set of social norms, Ásta (2018) on 
social properties of individuals as social statuses consisting in behavioral constraints and 
enablements, and Thomasson (2019) on the normativity of many of our social group concepts.  
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person’s consent). The existence of Border is partly a matter of the existence of River and partly 
a matter of the existence of these obligations or permissions.  
An important question to address before proceeding is whether the relevant kind of 
normativity is moral, legal, or merely social. That is, are the rights, duties, obligations, 
permissions, requirements, prohibitions, etc. that figure in the normative components of social 
objects moral, legal, or merely social in character? I endorse a pluralistic view according to 
which the relevant rights, duties, obligations, etc. may be ones of conventional morality or 
political morality, the law, or prescribed or practiced social norms or rules.23 On this pluralistic 
view, some social objects may have a moral nature, others may have a legal or social nature, and 
still others may have a hybrid nature.24  
 Let us now consider how the normative account of seemingly concrete social objects 
provides a solution to our puzzle. The normative account denies premise (3), which says that 
agreement cannot bring into existence concrete objects in the external world. It does so on the 
basis of the following reasoning: It is a consequence of the normative account that in 
circumstances where suitable material components already exist, a new concrete social object 
can be brought into existence through the creation of new rights, duties, obligations, permissions, 
or the like. These, in turn, can be created through the exercise of normative powers, with 
agreement being one form that such an exercise can take.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For some representative accounts of social norms and rules, see Hart (1961/2012: ch. 4.1), 
Bicchieri (2006: ch. 1), and Pettit (2008: §1). For our purposes here, we need not adjudicate 
between these different characterizations of social norms and rules.  
24 I leave open the possibility that there are other kinds of objects that have normative 
components involving other kinds of normativity (e.g., natural normativity tied to biological 
function). Such objects, however, would not be social objects in my view. I take it that the 
distinguishing characteristic of social objects is that they have normative components which 
involve conventional morality or political morality, the law, or prescribed or practiced social 
norms or rules.  
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 Normative powers are roughly powers to change the normative situation of oneself or 
others through mere say-so or through some other verbal or written act undertaken with the 
intention of effecting a normative change.25 Paradigm examples include the power of individuals 
to create new legal rights and obligations by drawing up a will or contract, the power of 
legitimate political authorities to create duties by decree or declaration, and the power of 
individuals to obligate themselves by making a promise or vow. While these paradigm examples 
concern the moral and legal domains, I take it that normative powers can also affect social norms 
and rules. Thus, for example, an authority on etiquette can create new social obligations by 
making a pronouncement on proper table manners, and a de facto political authority (even if 
illegitimate) can impose new behavioral constraints on members of the population by decree. As 
demonstrated by these various examples, an exercise of normative powers can take many 
different forms, including that of agreement. 
 By appealing to the phenomenon of normative powers, the normative account is able to 
provide a satisfying explanation of how agreement can bring into existence new concrete objects 
in the external world. More generally, it is able to explain how mere thought and talk can create 
such objects: certain mental-linguistic acts can constitute an exercise of normative powers, and 
an appropriate exercise of normative powers can create a new concrete social object in 
circumstances where suitable material components already exist.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Numerous authors have attempted to give a more precise characterization of normative powers 
or related phenomena. See Raz (1972: 94–96, 1999: 98–104) on normative powers, Hart (1982) 
on legal powers, Enoch (2011: §4.4) on robust reason-giving, and Perry (2013: 25) on moral 
powers.  
26 It may be thought that the proposed explanation is circular because the normative components 
of social objects might themselves involve normative powers (e.g., the normative components of 
legislatures might involve legal powers to create new laws). But in such cases, the social object 
is not created through the exercise of those very normative powers which figure in its normative 
components. Rather, it is created through the exercise of some other normative powers. Thus, 
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 One might worry that the normative account of social objects merely trades in one 
metaphysical mystery for another. At least insofar as rights, duties, etc. are objective things that 
are part of the normative fabric of the world, it seems mysterious that we should have the power 
to create such things out of thin air, through our mere say-so.27 But normative powers are not 
posits of the normative account of social objects. We clearly have such powers. And so the 
metaphysical mystery surrounding them is a mystery that everyone must contend with. 
Furthermore, there are viable proposals in the literature for how to resolve this mystery.28 Thus, 
the normative account of social objects does not leave us with a new and unresolvable 
metaphysical mystery concerning normative powers.   
 
5. Normative hylomorphism  
 
 Thus far, I have proposed that concrete social objects have both normative and material 
components to them. In order for this proposal to constitute more than a mere sketch, three main 
questions need to be addressed. First, what exactly are the material components of concrete 
social objects? Second, what exactly are their normative components? And third, in exactly what 
sense are both of these components of concrete social objects? In this section I develop my initial 
proposal into a more full-fledged hylomorphic theory of concrete social objects, through a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
there is no circularity. Provided that we recognize the existence of some basic normative powers 
which are not themselves created through the exercise of other normative powers (cf. Raz 2019: 
§2), there is also no explanatory regress. 
27 Cf. Hume (Treatise of Human Nature 3.2.5) and Enoch (2011: 1, 2014: 296). 
28 See especially Enoch (2011: §4.1, 2014: §3). Enoch suggests that any case of robust reason-
giving is really a case of the triggering of a pre-existing conditional reason. This suggestion 
might dissolve the metaphysical mystery surrounding moral powers. See also Enoch’s discussion 
of the ‘Constitutive Model’ (2011: §4.2). Enoch rejects this model in cases of robust reason-
giving, but the model might be applicable to some of the normative powers we are interested in, 
e.g., powers affecting prescribed social rules. 
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consideration of these questions. I then explain how the theory is able to solve the puzzle while 
at the same time satisfying our desiderata.  
5.1 Material components  
 Let us begin with the question of material components. In the simple imaginary case of 
Border, there is one material component and it is an ordinary material object, viz. a certain river. 
Historically, many real-world borders and boundaries likewise had ordinary material objects 
such as rivers or mountain ranges as their material components. Some other kinds of concrete 
social objects also have ordinary material objects as their material components. These include 
pieces of money, credit cards, and official documents such as passports and driver’s licenses. 
Thus, for example, we may take the material component of a U.S. dollar bill to be a piece of 
paper with an inscription on it, and the material component of a credit card to be a piece of 
plastic with an engraving on it.  
 Many other concrete social objects have people as their material components. This is the 
case for social groups such as clubs, teams, and committees. Thus, for example, the material 
components of the Graduate Admissions Committee are the individual members of this 
committee. While social groups are the most salient kind of concrete social objects with people 
as material components, they are not the only such kind. Married couples, for instance, also have 
people as their material components. There may even be some concrete social objects with only 
one person as a material component—for instance, the owner of a sole proprietorship may be its 
only material component.  
 There are some concrete social objects whose material components are neither ordinary 
material objects nor people. Consider, for example, the border between Vermont and New 
Hampshire, which lies along the west bank of the Connecticut River. Unlike in the imaginary 
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case of Border, it would be implausible to suppose that the material component of the Vermont-
New Hampshire border is a certain river, viz. the Connecticut River. For the Vermont-New 
Hampshire border and the Connecticut River have different locations. The river lies to the east of 
the border and thus belongs to New Hampshire. Nor can we take the material component to be 
the west bank of the Connecticut River, where the west bank is construed as a certain portion of 
land. For this portion of land would have a height and volume, whereas the border does not have 
a height and volume. I suggest that we instead take the material component of the Vermont-New 
Hampshire border to be a certain line in space. More generally, I suggest that the material 
components of some concrete social objects are quasi-material objects, i.e. objects that are 
spatially located but do not occupy space in the way that ordinary material objects do. Examples 
of quasi-material objects include lines in space, planes in space, and perhaps regions of space. 
Lines in space may serve as the material components of modern-day political borders, planes in 
space as the material components of airspace boundaries, and regions of space as the material 
components of domestic airspace.  
 A further difficult case is institutions consisting of other institutions. An example is the 
United States Congress, which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate. It may 
be thought that the material components of the United States Congress are the U.S. 
representatives and U.S. senators (perhaps along with the Capitol building). Yet it is hard to see 
how such a view could account for the apparent fact that the United States Congress consists of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. The way around this difficulty is to allow for 
concrete social objects themselves to be material components of other concrete social objects. 
We may then take the material components of the United States Congress to be the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Other institutions, organizations, social groups, and political 
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entities consisting of other such entities may likewise be taken to have concrete social objects as 
material components. For example, we may take the material components of the United States of 
America to be the fifty U.S. states. 
 My final proposal, then, is that any material component of a concrete social object 
belongs to one of the following four categories: (i) ordinary material object, (ii) person, (iii) 
quasi-material object, or (iv) concrete social object. Note that the various material components of 
a given concrete social object may belong to different categories. For example, the material 
components of universities are plausibility taken to include both persons (e.g., students and 
faculty) and ordinary material objects (e.g., libraries and lecture halls). Moreover, whereas some 
concrete social objects cannot change their material components over time, others can. For 
example, a particular U.S. dollar bill cannot come to have a different piece of paper as its 
material component, and a married couple cannot come to have different people as its material 
components. In contrast, a committee can come to have different individuals as its material 
components, and a political border can come to have a different line in space as its material 
component.  
5.2 Normative components  
 Let us now turn to the question of normative components. To elucidate the nature of 
normative components, I will draw on an idea in the Aristotelian hylomorphic tradition. 
Hylomorphists maintain that objects are to be understood in terms of both matter and form. The 
basic idea may be illustrated with the simple example of an H2O molecule. Its matter is two 
hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom, and its form involves a certain chemical arrangement that 
is exhibited by the atoms, viz. that of being chemically bonded in the appropriate way. A central 
challenge for hylomorphism is to clarify what exactly form is, in a way that makes it 
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unmysterious and palatable.29 One prominent alternative, which has been embraced by a number 
of contemporary hylomorphists including Kit Fine (1982, 1999) and Mark Johnston (2006), says 
that properties and relations may play the role of form.30 Drawing on this idea, I propose that we 
take the normative components of concrete social objects to be normative properties and 
relations. This is an attractive way of construing normative components because normative 
properties and relations are relatively familiar entities, which many contemporary 
metaphysicians already countenance in their ontology.  
 In the case of concrete social objects with only one material component, the normative 
components are relational normative properties of the form ‘being normatively related thus-and-
so to such-and-such’. For example, the normative component of the Vermont-New Hampshire 
border may be taken to be the relational normative property being such that Vermont has legal 
jurisdiction over the geographical area to the west of it and New Hampshire has legal 
jurisdiction over the geographical area to the east of it. And the normative component of U.S. 
dollar bills may be taken to be a relational normative property such as being such that persons in 
the United States have the legal right to repay public or private debts in the United States with it.   
 In the case of concrete social objects with more than one material component, the 
normative components are intrinsic or extrinsic normative relations. An intrinsic normative 
relation is a normative relation that n things stand in entirely in virtue of how they are 
normatively related to each other. Such relations have the form ‘being normatively related thus-
and-so to each other’. Consider, for example, married couples. Insofar as we construe marriage 
as a moral phenomenon that goes beyond the law, we may take the normative components of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For a nice survey of the different accounts on offer, see Koslicki (2018: §3.2).  
30 On Fine’s (1999) theory, properties and relations play the role of form in the case of rigid 
embodiments, whereas functions play the role of form in the case of variable embodiments.  
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married couples to include the intrinsic normative relation being morally obligated to support in 
sickness and in health. An extrinsic normative relation, on the other hand, is a normative relation 
that n things stand in partly in virtue of how they are normatively related to other things outside 
of them. Such relations have the form ‘being normatively related thus-and-so to each other and 
such-and-such’. Consider, for example, the Graduate Admissions Committee. We may take its 
normative component to be the extrinsic normative relation together having the power to admit 
graduate students. Note that the normative components of some concrete social objects may 
include both intrinsic and extrinsic normative relations. A plausible example is the United States 
Congress. Its normative components may include certain fundamental legal relations that hold 
between the House and the Senate, as well as certain legal relations that relate the House and the 
Senate to the other branches of government.  
To summarize my proposal, any normative component of a concrete social object belongs 
to one of the following three categories: (i) relational normative property, (ii) intrinsic normative 
relation, or (iii) extrinsic normative relation. Concrete social objects with only one material 
component have normative components belonging to the first category, whereas those with more 
than one material component have normative components belonging to the second or third 
categories. Unlike in the case of material components, I take it that no concrete social object can 
change its normative components over time.31 However, since properties and relations can be 
realized in different ways, my view still allows for concrete social objects to change the specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In my view, any concrete social object x essentially belongs to some kind K, which is 
essentially associated with some particular set of normative components (see §5.3). Thus, any 
concrete social object x is essentially associated with some particular set of normative 
components. It follows that no concrete social object can change its normative components over 
time. Such a change would mean that the object is associated with one set of normative 
components at one time and a different set of these components at a later time. But this cannot 
happen, since the object is essentially associated with a particular set of normative components.  
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ways in which their normative components are realized over time. Thus, for example, the view 
allows for the possibility that the normative component of the Graduate Admissions Committee 
is realized at one time by the instantiation of the relation together having the power to admit 
Master’s students, while at another time it is realized by the instantiation of the relation together 
having the power to admit Master’s and PhD students. In this way, the view is able to account 
for cases in which a given concrete social object appears to undergo some change in its 
normative profile over time.  
5.3 Material-normative compounds  
 I have now provided an account of the material and normative components of concrete 
social objects. But in what sense, exactly, are these components? In other words, in what sense 
are concrete social objects ‘made up’ of these entities? To answer this question, I will draw on 
another idea that has been espoused by some contemporary hylomorphists including Kit Fine 
(1999) and Kathrin Koslicki (2008: ch. 7). The idea is that matter and form are literally proper 
parts of matter-form compounds. A simple application of this idea to our earlier example of an 
H2O molecule would have it that the proper parts of this molecule include two hydrogen atoms, 
an oxygen atom, and a certain chemical arrangement that is exhibited by these atoms. Along 
similar lines, I suggest that the material components (‘matter’) and normative components 
(‘form’) of concrete social objects are literally proper parts of these objects.32 These parts come 
together to form a compound whole when the material components instantiate the normative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Given that proper parthood is transitive, a concrete social object will typically have further 
proper parts in addition to its material and normative components. Thus, for example, the proper 
parts of a U.S. dollar bill will include not only a piece of paper and a certain relational normative 
property, but also the proper parts of the piece of paper. These further proper parts, however, are 
not further components of the U.S. dollar bill in the intended sense. We may think of a concrete 
social object’s material and normative components as its ‘immediate’ or ‘direct’ proper parts.  
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components. It is in this straightforward sense that concrete social objects are ‘made up’ of their 
material and normative components.  
 It is important to note that on this proposal, a concrete social object is not a mereological 
sum of its material and normative components. If there is a mereological sum of these 
components, then it exists whenever the components exist.33 But on the present proposal, a 
concrete social object exists only when its material components instantiate its normative 
components. And all of these components might exist without the former instantiating the latter.  
Concrete social objects are wholes of a different kind. Let us call these wholes material-
normative compounds. I will assume that any material-normative compound x essentially 
belongs to some material-normative kind K (e.g., border, money, state, committee, university), 
and that any material-normative kind K is essentially associated with a set of normative 
components and a range of suitable material components.34 The range of suitable material 
components will generally depend upon the function associated with kind K. Thus, for example, 
since the function of a border is to demarcate a territory, the range of suitable material 
components associated with the kind border includes all of the things that are suitable for serving 
this function (e.g., rivers, mountain ranges, lines in space, etc.). The following principle, then, 
tells us when a material-normative compound x of kind K exists:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 I wish to remain neutral on whether there are such sums. The important point for our purposes 
is that no concrete social object is identical to such a sum, even if such sums exist. 
34 Here I draw on aspects of Koslicki’s approach. Koslicki presupposes an ontology of kinds and 
associates each kind with a set of formal components (2008: ch. 7). I believe that my 
presupposed ontology of material-normative kinds accords well with both commonsense and 
classifications in the social sciences. Furthermore, it allows us to formulate simple and elegant 
principles of existence and parthood for material-normative compounds (see below). In this 
regard, it arguably fares better than various alternatives, such as an ontology according to which 
any material-normative kind K is essentially associated with multiple sets of normative 
components. That being said, a full defense of this ontology of material-normative kinds is 
beyond the scope of the present paper.  
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EXISTENCE A material-normative compound x of kind K, associated with normative 
components R1,…, Rn and a range of suitable material components, exists 
at a time t if and only if (i) there exist some suitable material components 
m1,…, mk which are the material components of x at t; and (ii) m1,…, mk 
stand in relations R1,…, Rn at t.35 
 
And at any time t at which a material-normative compound x of kind K exists, it satisfies the 
following principle of parthood:  
 
PARTHOOD  (i) Each material component of x at t is a part of x at t; and (ii) each of the 
normative components associated with kind K is a part of x.  
 
 It may be thought that PARTHOOD has unacceptable consequences for the location of 
material-normative compounds. It seems plausible to suppose that at any time t at which an 
object exists, it is located wherever its parts at t are located. Call this the parthood-location link. 
It follows from PARTHOOD and the parthood-location link that at any time t at which a material-
normative compound x of kind K exists, it is partly located wherever the normative components 
associated with kind K are located. This arguably leads to counterintuitive results when these 
components include relational properties or extrinsic relations. Consider, for example, U.S. 
dollar bills. Let us suppose that the relevant relational normative properties include being such 
that persons in the United States have the legal right to repay public or private debts in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Note that R1,…, Rn are relational properties if there is only one material component and multi-
place relations if there is more than one material component.	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United States with it. Since this property involves persons in the United States, it is arguably 
partly located wherever persons in the United States are located. But then it follows that the 
dollar bill in my wallet is partly located where, e.g., Barack Obama is located. Yet this is absurd. 
This consequence can be avoided by adopting the widely held view that relations (and relational 
properties) are not located in space and time (and do not have parts which are located in space 
and time).36 As Bertrand Russell famously put it, relations are “[n]owhere and nowhen” 
(1912/2001: 56). Given this view of relations, the normative components associated with kind K 
make a null contribution to x’s spatiotemporal location. Thus, being such that persons in the 
United States have the legal right to repay public or private debts in the United States with it 
makes a null contribution to the location of the dollar bill, and so we avoid the absurd result that 
the dollar bill is partly located where Obama is located.  
This brings us to my preferred principle of location for material-normative compounds 
such as dollar bills and borders, whose material components include only ordinary material 
objects and/or quasi-material objects. At any time t at which such a material-normative 
compound x of kind K exists, it satisfies the following location principle:  
 
LOCATION  x is located at t wherever its material components at t are located.  
 
There are special difficulties concerning the location of material-normative compounds such as 
organizations and universities, whose material components typically include persons and/or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Note that on this widely held view, relations (and relational properties) are not located in a 
Platonic heaven. Rather, these entities simply lack a location (cf. Balaguer 2016: §1). Thus, we 
are not left with the consequence that the dollar bill is partly located in a Platonic heaven.  
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concrete social objects.37 As the restricted location principle proposed above suffices for the 
purposes of solving our puzzle, I will not attempt to state principles of location for these more 
difficult and controversial cases here.  
5.4 The normative hylomorphic solution   
With these three principles in hand, we can now articulate precisely how the normative 
hylomorphic view of concrete social objects provides a satisfying solution to our puzzle, while at 
the same time satisfying the desiderata of Existence, Non-identity, and Materiality.  
 Let us begin with the desiderata. EXISTENCE ensures that Existence is satisfied. 
Immediately after Crusoe and Cassandra’s agreement, there is a suitable material component 
(viz., River) which is the material component of Border and has the relational normative 
properties associated with the kind border. It follows from EXISTENCE that Border exists at this 
time. Non-identity is secured by the second clause of PARTHOOD. According to this clause, the 
relevant relational normative properties are parts of Border. Yet these relational normative 
properties are not parts of River. Since Border and River have different parts, they are 
numerically distinct objects (by similar reasoning, Border is distinct from any temporal part of 
River). Finally, Materiality is secured by the first clause of PARTHOOD. According to this clause, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Consider, for example, Dartmouth College. Its material components are plausibly taken to 
include its faculty and students, as well as various ordinary material objects such as buildings. 
Yet the college need not be located where its faculty and students are located. When some of its 
students go to Florida for spring break, the college does not thereby become partly located in 
Florida. It remains wholly located in Hanover, NH. Thus, the location of Dartmouth College is 
not given by the location principle proposed above. Note that this location problem is not 
specific to my theory of material-normative compounds. The problem arises for any view on 
which the members of an organization are parts of that organization. For further discussion of the 
problem, see Ruben (1983, 1985: chs. 1–2), Hindriks (2013), Hawley (2017: §6), and Fine 
(2020: §1). A solution along the lines proposed by Fine could be adapted to our own framework. 
Roughly, the idea would be that a material-normative compound such as Dartmouth College 
inherits the location of only some of its material components (e.g., its buildings, its lawns, etc.). 
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following Crusoe and Cassandra’s agreement, River is a part of Border. Since River is a material 
object, it follows that Border has a material part.  
 Let us now turn to the normative hylomorphic solution to the puzzle. It follows from 
EXISTENCE that in circumstances where certain suitable material components already exist, a new 
material-normative compound x of kind K can be brought into existence by making it the case 
that these material components instantiate the normative components associated with K. But the 
instantiation of such components (viz., relational normative properties or normative relations) is 
just a matter of certain agents having certain rights, duties, obligations, permissions, powers, or 
the like. And we can bring this about through the exercise of normative powers, with agreement 
being one form that such an exercise can take. Agreement can thus bring into existence new 
material-normative compounds. By LOCATION, at least some such compounds are located 
wherever their material components are located, and so they are concrete objects in the external 
world. It follows that agreement can bring into existence concrete objects in the external world, 
contra premise (3) of the puzzle.   
 In addition to explaining creation-by-agreement and the like, the normative hylomorphic 
view can also explain away the intuitive appeal of the metaphysical principle motivating premise 
(3), viz. the principle which says that thought and talk alone cannot bring into existence concrete 
objects in the external world. For while the normative hylomorphic view is incompatible with 
this principle, it is nevertheless compatible with a closely related principle which says that 
thought and talk alone cannot bring into existence concrete objects in the external world ex 
nihilo. It is compatible with this qualified principle because on the normative hylomorphic view, 
thought and talk alone can only create new material-normative compounds from suitable pre-
existing material components. The normative hylomorphist may therefore maintain that the 
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initial intuitive appeal of the unqualified principle stems from a failure to properly distinguish 
between these two closely related—but importantly different—principles.  
 
6. Further developments 
 
I will now consider two potential challenges that may be raised for the proposed 
normative hylomorphic theory and indicate how the theory may be further developed in response 
to these challenges.  
6.1 Property divergence  
 The first challenge concerns property divergence. By LOCATION, Border and River are 
spatially coincident objects. Typically, spatially coincident objects share a wide range of 
properties in common, especially spatial and physical properties. Thus, for example, a statue and 
the clay from which it is made share the same location, size, weight, shape, and volume. Yet 
there seems to be a significant divergence in the spatial and physical properties of Border and 
River. For instance, River has a determinate temperature, but it seems weird to ascribe any 
temperature to Border. A statement like “Border is fifty degrees Fahrenheit today” strikes us as 
odd. Furthermore, suppose that River is full of fish. It seems odd to attribute this property to 
Border. The challenge, then, is to explain (or explain away) this apparent divergence in the 
spatial and physical properties of Border and River, when there is no similar divergence in the 
case of the statue and the clay.  
 I would like to suggest that the apparent divergence in spatial and physical properties is 
merely apparent and that in fact, Border and River do share their spatial and physical properties 
in common. The oddity of saying that Border is fifty degrees Fahrenheit or that Border is full of 
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fish can be explained away as follows. First, as I suggested earlier, modern-day real-world 
borders are plausibly taken to have lines in space rather than ordinary material objects as 
material components. Lines in space do not instantiate properties such as being fifty degrees 
Fahrenheit or being full of fish, and neither do these real-world borders. Statements like “Border 
is fifty degrees Fahrenheit today” and “Border is full of fish” may strike us as odd simply 
because the borders that we are most familiar with do not have such properties, and so we are 
accustomed to thinking of borders in general as not having such properties.  
Furthermore, there is a pragmatic explanation of the oddity of these statements. From a 
practical standpoint, social objects are of interest and concern to us in large part because of the 
functions they serve. For example, dollar bills are of practical interest and concern to us because 
they function as a medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account. This practical 
interest is reflected in our ordinary thought and talk about concrete social objects. Typically, we 
do not concern ourselves with those spatial and physical properties of concrete social objects 
which are altogether irrelevant to the fulfillment of the object’s function. Thus, we typically do 
not concern ourselves with the temperature or the animal inhabitation of river borders, since 
these properties are irrelevant to the fulfillment of the function of demarcating a territory. This 
explains why the statements in question may strike us as odd, even when they are true.38  
6.2 Immaterial social objects  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Note that the identity theorist cannot deploy similar reasoning to explain away the apparent 
divergence in the normative properties of Border and River (discussed in §3.1). For natural 
objects like rivers are oftentimes of practical interest and concern to us precisely because of the 
roles they play in our culture, society, politics, or religion. For example, the Ganges River in 
India is sacred to Hindus and is therefore of great practical interest and concern to many. 
Provided that normative properties are at least somewhat relevant to the playing of such social 
and cultural roles, it follows that the normative properties of natural objects are oftentimes 
relevant to our practical interests. 
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 The second challenge for the proposed normative hylomorphic theory concerns 
immaterial social objects. Consider, for example, tokens of digital currencies such as bitcoin. A 
particular bitcoin is not associated with a particular piece of hardware in the way that a particular 
dollar bill is associated with a particular piece of paper. Thus, unlike a dollar bill, a bitcoin does 
not appear to have a material component to it. The U.S. Constitution, the speed limit on Highway 
1 in California, and the online store Etsy are further examples of social objects that appear to 
lack material components. The challenge for the normative hylomorphist is to show how the 
theory developed thus far may be extended to account for such immaterial or abstract social 
objects.39  
 I propose to meet this challenge by countenancing immaterial-normative compounds in 
addition to material-normative compounds. Immaterial-normative compounds have normative 
properties or relations as their normative components, but they do not have any material 
components. Instead they have immaterial components, which are immaterial or abstract objects 
such as numbers, propositions, sets, software, websites, bits of data, etc. By countenancing such 
immaterial-normative compounds, we are able to account for social objects like bitcoins, 
constitutions, speed limits, and online stores. Thus, for instance, we may take bitcoins to be 
immaterial-normative compounds whose immaterial components are bits of data. And we may 
take constitutions, speed limits, and online stores to be immaterial-normative compounds whose 
immaterial components are propositions, numbers, and websites, respectively.  
Like material-normative compounds, immaterial-normative compounds are governed by 
principles of existence, parthood, and location. The following principle tells us when an 
immaterial-normative compound x of kind K exists:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Smith (2003: 285–91) and Thomasson (2003: 273) raise a similar challenge for Searle’s theory 
of institutional reality.  
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EXISTENCEʹ′ An immaterial-normative compound x of kind K, associated with 
normative components R1,…, Rn and a range of suitable immaterial 
components, exists at a time t if and only if (i) there exist some suitable 
immaterial components m1,…, mk which are the immaterial components of 
x at t; and (ii) m1,…, mk stand in relations R1,…, Rn at t.40 
 
And at any time t at which an immaterial-normative compound x of kind K exists, it satisfies the 
following principle of parthood:  
 
PARTHOODʹ′  (i) Each immaterial component of x at t is a part of x at t; and (ii) each of 
the normative components associated with kind K is a part of x.  
 
Finally, given that immaterial or abstract objects are not spatially located, it is plausible to 
suppose that immaterial-normative compounds are not spatially located. Thus, at any time t at 
which an immaterial-normative compound x of kind K exists, it satisfies the following location 
principle:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 It is presumed here that immaterial-normative compounds exist in time, which might seem odd 
given that they are entirely immaterial or abstract. But immaterial-normative compounds are no 
different in this regard than artifacts such as musical works, novels, and fictional characters, 
which are widely held to be abstract objects that exist in time. See, e.g., Levinson (1980), 
Thomasson (1999), and Evnine (2016: §4.4). Furthermore, the fact that immaterial-normative 
compounds exist in time is explicable: their existence is a matter of some immaterial components 
instantiating some normative components, and this instantiation occurs in time even if the 
components themselves do not exist in time. Compare: the number 13 currently instantiates the 
property being my favorite number, and this instantiation occurs in time even though both the 
number and the property are arguably abstract objects that do not exist in time. 
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LOCATIONʹ′  x is not spatially located at t.  
  
It may be thought that this proposed extension of the normative hylomorphic theory is in 
tension with the central commitment of hylomorphism, viz. that objects are in some sense 
compounds of matter and form. For given the ordinary dictionary definition of ‘matter’ as 
physical substance in the universe, immaterial or abstract matter is a contradiction in terms. But 
the hylomorphist need not construe matter as physical substance in the universe.41 Instead, she 
can construe an object’s matter as the substance(s) from which that object is made. Given this 
alternate conception of matter, the idea of immaterial or abstract matter is not inherently 
contradictory.  
 
7. Comparison with other accounts 
 
I will conclude by briefly comparing my normative hylomorphic theory of social objects 
with two prominent views in the social ontology literature: John Searle’s (1995) theory of 
institutional facts and Katherine Ritchie’s (2013, 2020) account of organized social groups. This 
comparison will help to further clarify and highlight what is distinctive about my account.  
Searle’s theory focuses on institutional social facts, which are facts that cannot obtain 
without human institutions. According to Searle, we create such facts by assigning statuses with 
associated functions (‘status functions’) to physical entities in the world (1995: 39–41). And we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Many hylomorphists evidently do not construe matter in this way, as they countenance 
hylomorphic compounds with immaterial or abstract matter. See, e.g., Aristotle (Metaphysics 
Z.10 1036a9–12) on the ‘intelligible matter’ of mathematical objects, Fine (1999: 72) on variable 
embodiments with immaterial manifestations, Johnston (2006: 654–55) on abstract unities, and 
Evnine (2016: §4.4) on abstract artifacts such as musical works, fictional characters, and 
languages.  
	   	   	  
	  
Norm and Object  37 
do this through our collective acceptance of ‘constitutive rules’ of the form ‘X counts as Y in C’, 
where ‘X’ picks out a particular object or a class of objects which meet certain specified 
conditions, ‘Y’ names a status function, and ‘C’ names a context (1995: 43–46). Moreover, on 
Searle’s view, status functions typically carry ‘deontic powers’ such as rights, duties, obligations, 
or permissions. And so assignments of status function typically involve an assignment of deontic 
powers to some individuals (1995: 100–101).  
My normative hylomorphic theory converges with Searle’s theory on the idea that social 
reality has both a physical and a normative aspect to it. However, my theory concerns social 
objects whereas Searle’s theory primarily concerns social facts. Social objects are things like 
borders, dollar bills, and committees. Social facts are entities like the fact that the river is (or 
constitutes) a border, the fact that the piece of paper is (or constitutes) a dollar bill, and the fact 
that the committee is composed of people. Social objects persist through time and can undergo 
change over time whereas social facts do not persist or change in this way; social objects exist 
whereas social facts obtain; and many social objects occupy a determinate region of space 
whereas social facts do not occupy space in this way. These differences demonstrate that social 
objects and social facts are distinct sorts of social entities. Thus, my theory and Searle’s theory 
are focused on explaining different phenomena.42  
The target of Ritchie’s account is organized social groups such as clubs, committees, and 
teams. Such entities are social objects in the relevant sense, and so this target is closer to my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Searle does make some suggestive remarks about social objects, which I discussed earlier. 
Some of these remarks indicate that Searle holds an identity view of seemingly concrete social 
objects (see §3.1), whereas others suggest that he holds an eliminativist view (see §3.3). For an 
argument that Searle is best construed as an identity theorist, see Hansson Wahlberg (2014: §2). 
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own.43 According to Ritchie, an organized social group is a realization of a structure (2013: §6). 
Whenever an organized social group exists, it has some members and a structure that is realized 
by its members. The structure is a complex or network of relations that together capture the 
functional organization of the group (2020: 405, 411). Ritchie originally proposed that this 
structure consists of functional relations (2013: 268), but more recently she has suggested that in 
at least some cases it might include normative relations (2020: 411).  
 My normative hylomorphic account agrees with Ritchie’s structuralist account that 
organized social groups such as clubs, committees, and teams are to be understood in terms of 
both their members and certain relations that hold between the members. However, our accounts 
differ over the nature of the relevant relations. In my view, these are always normative relations 
involving conventional morality or political morality, the law, or social norms or rules. For 
Ritchie, on the other hand, these may be functional relations. Thus, for example, whereas my 
account says that the relevant relations in the case of the Graduate Admissions Committee are 
normative relations such as together having the power to admit graduate students, Ritchie’s 
account implies that these may be functional relations such as together admitting graduate 
students. Normativity is thus more integral to the identity of organized social groups on my 
account than on Ritchie’s account.  
A final point worth emphasizing is that my normative hylomorphic theory aims to 
account for the whole vast array of social objects, which includes organized social groups but 
much else besides—for instance, borders, states, dollars, bitcoins, corporations, organizations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ritchie also develops an account of what she calls ‘feature social groups’, which include racial 
groups, gender groups, and economic classes (2020: §5). I take it that feature social groups are 
not social objects in my sense, and so this part of Ritchie’s account has a different target than my 
own account. For this reason, I focus here on Ritchie’s account of organized social groups.  
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universities, and constitutions. In so doing, it seeks to advance our understanding of the social 
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